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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Modern financial engineering has paved the way for creation of a great variety of financial 
instruments, which blend financial elements and other entitlements in one form or another. 
New “financial gadgets” blurred the underlying legal concepts of debt and equity, thereby 
making distinction between debt and equity be one of the most prominent problems in tax 
area.1  
These financial instruments due to their mixed character of debt and equity are called “hybrid 
financial instruments”.2 They are primarily used in financing of companies in order to 
provide certain desired characteristics not present in purer forms of debt or equity.3 For the 
corporate tax purposes the remuneration derived under hybrid financial instruments is treated 
dichotomously either as dividend or as interest.4  The necessity for precise identification is 
caused by the different tax treatment of debt (interests) and equity (dividends) in the tax world 
based on the benefit tax principle. In a cross-border transaction interests are usually 
deductible in the source state of the borrower and are only taxed in the resident state of the 
lender. Whereas dividends are usually subject to tax in the source state and are exempt in the 
state of the capital lender. 5 Therefore, with a view to the different tax treatment of dividends 
and interests, inconsistency in qualification by two or more countries can result in either 
double taxation (positive classification conflict) or double non-taxation (negative 
classification conflict).6   
To this end, in a cross-border context hybrid mismatch arrangements, which exploit 
differences in the tax treatment of instruments between two or more countries,7 have become 
a widely used tool in sophisticated tax planning structures since a taxpayer using legal 
arrangements could manage deductibility, inclusion, timing or character of payments made 
under hybrid financial instruments. 8  More specifically, MNEs, using hybrid financial 
instruments, could obtain more incentives to leverage the company in order to benefit from 
the “double dip” phenomenon, based on a deduction by a borrowing company without 
income inclusion by a lender.9  This phenomenon distorts the single tax principle (income 
should be taxed once - not more and not less), which underlies the coherent international tax 
regime.10 Alternatively, hybrid mismatch arrangements may lead to a tax deferral which if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 W. Schön, ‘The Distinct Equity of the Debt-Equity Distinction’, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol.66, 
No 9 (2012), p.491 
2 P. J. Connors & G. H.J. Woll, ‘Hybrid Instruments – Current Issues’, August (2001), p.1 
http://204.154.93.32/fileupload/5029.pdf  accessed 20.04.2014 
3 Ibid 
4 S. Bärsch, ‘Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom in an 
International and Cross-border Context’, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (2012), p.86 5 S. Bärsch & C. Spengel, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: OECD Recommendations and German Practice’, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol.67, No 10 (2013), p.521 
6 M. Helminen, ‘The Dividend Concept in International Tax Law: Dividend Payments Between Corporate 
Entities’, Kluwer Law International (1999), p.51 
7 Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, OECD (2012), p.5 
8 Peter J. Connors & Glenn H.J. Woll (n 2) p.1  
9 P.H. Blessing, ‘The Debt-Equity Conundrum - A Prequel’, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol. 66, No 4/5 
(2012), p.203 
10 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage, And The International Tax Regime’, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, Vol. 61, No 4 (2007), pp.135-136 
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maintained over several years is economically similar to double non-taxation.11 
The indicated problem stems from the fact that classification issues are matters for domestic 
law12 and contracting states usually do not concern about the treatment of the corresponding 
payment made under hybrid financial instrument in tax systems of each other. For instance, 
the recent decision of the Dutch Supreme Court13 recognized participation exemption in 
respect to the payment made under redeemable preference shares by classifying the payment 
as a dividend even though the paying company in Australia treated the payment as interests 
and therefore deducted it for tax purposes.   
The legal pluralism, which is intrinsic to cross-border taxation,14 seems to exacerbate the 
problem of inconsistence classification. On the one hand, the domestic tax law, tax treaties 
law and EU tax law are independent legal systems of international tax law.15 On the other 
hand, notwithstanding that tax treaties are at a different level compared to the domestic 
legislations of the contracting states,16 they face legal pluralism as a natural condition for their 
application, since they permit characterization of dividend based on the domestic law of either 
contracting state.17  By contrast, EU Directives should not depend on the internal law 
classification unless otherwise expressly stated in the Directives,18 however the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive,19 in its turn, lacks of defined autonomous certain definition. In this way, 
ambiguous order of priority of these legal systems for classification of hybrid financial 
instruments leaves the loopholes, which can be exploited in aggressive tax planning. 
The EU Commission has pointed out that aggressive tax planning consists of “taking 
advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax 
systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability”.20 Despite the fact that hybrid mismatch 
arrangements is the form of aggressive tax planning, general anti-avoidance rules based on a 
judicial doctrine such as “abuse of law” cannot be effectively relied on to prevent them.21 This 
doctrine assumes existence of artificial arrangements.22 But hybrid mismatch arrangements do 
not necessarily lack of genuine economic activity behind them.  
However, the recent policy has demonstrated that double non-taxation as a consequence of 
such mismatches is not going to be tolerated and this issue is in the spotlight on the political, 
legislative and international levels.23 The main concern is that the legislation itself gives rise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, OECD (2012), p.5 
12 Peter H. Blessing (n 9) p.203 
13 Dutch Supreme Court 7 February 2014, no. 12/03540 and no. 12/04640; 
http://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2014/03/international-tax-news-march-2014/tax-treatment-
of-hybrid-finance-instruments/#_ftnref7 accessed on 11.05.2014 
14 Pasquale Pistone, ‘Soft Tax Law: Steering Legal Pluralism towards International Tax Coordination’, p. 99 in 
Dennis M. Weber, ‘Traditional and Alternative Routes to European Tax Integration’, IBFD (2010) 15 M. Helminen, (1999) (n.6) p.64 
16 Raffaele Russo, ‘Fundamentals of International Tax Planning’, IBFD (2007), p.13 
17 Article 3.2 of the OECD Model (2010); Pasquale Pistone (n 14) pp. 99-100  
18 C. Brokelind, ‘Swedish Supreme Administrative Court Rejects Reference to ECJ Regarding Application of EC 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive’, European Taxation, Vol.45, No 8 (2005), p.326 
19 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case 
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (Parent-Subsidiary Directive) 
20 Commission, ‘Recommendation of 6.12.2012 on aggressive tax planning’ C(2012)8806 final, p.2 
21 Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, OECD (2012), p.13 
22 Case C‑196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I‑7995 
23 C(2012)8806 final; Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council - An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion’ Com (2012) 722 final; Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, OECD (2012); Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, OECD (2013) (Action Plan on BEPS) http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf; 
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to the tax arbitrage opportunities connected with hybrid instruments.  
Particularly, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, which is aimed at “to ensure the neutrality, from 
the tax point of view, of the distribution of profits by a subsidiary established in one Member 
State to its parent company established in another Member State»,24 grants Member States an 
option to refrain from taxing the dividends distributed from non-resident subsidiaries.25 And 
this option is deemed to be interpreted as such irrespective of the fact that the profit 
distribution has been treated as a tax-deductible payment in the Member State where the 
paying subsidiary is a resident.26  
In order to “ensure that the application of the directive does not inadvertently prevent 
effective action against double non-taxation in the area of hybrid loan structures”,27 the 
Commission proposed to amend the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 28  and the European 
Parliament gave strong backing to this proposal.29 
The proposed changes to the Directive are twofold and include, firstly, withdrawal of the tax 
exemption for a profit distribution that was deductible by the subsidiary of the parent 
company.30 Secondly, it is proposed to amend the anti-abuse provisions by making them more 
detailed and therefore bind Member States to follow GAAR.   
However, such a technical “point-based” solution of the problem, which is stemmed from the 
coexistence of taxing sovereignties and legal pluralism, raises certain concerns. Firstly, it 
increases complexity of tax rules and arguably could have unforeseeable implications. 
Secondly, even though EU law accepts “linking rules”, which make tax treatment in one 
country conditional on tax treatment in another country (e.g., CFC rules), they always have to 
be in compliance with the principles established by the primary EU law.   
1.2 Purpose 
With acknowledgment that the proposed changes are highly driven by the political debate 
around aggressive tax planning undertaken by MNEs, the purpose of this paper is to put the 
proposal, which is aimed at achieving that “not one company can escape taxation by 
loopholes from hybrid financing in cross-border situations”,31 into EU legal framework and 
consider it in terms of compatibility with non-discrimination principles on fundamental 
freedoms, established by the ECJ through the case-law. Moreover, the author endeavors to 
answer to what extent the proposal constitutes comprehensive solution to the problem of 
hybrid financial instruments mismatches. To this end, the answer cannot be limited to the 
problem of double non-taxation, but it shall be fairly addressed in terms of double taxation 
problem as well. 
Consideration of the above matters will be supported by the study of the ways how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Commission, ‘Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system 
of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States’ COM (2013) 
814 final 
24 Case C‑247/08 Gaz de France – Berliner Investissement SA v Bundeszentralamt für Steuern [2009] ECR I-
09225, para 57 
25 Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Article 4(1)(a) 26 COM (2013) 814 final, p.3 
27 COM (2012) 722 final, p.9 
28 COM (2013) 814 final 
29 European Commission, STATEMENT/14/92 dd 02/04/2014 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_STATEMENT-14-92_en.htm?locale=en accessed 20.04.2014 
30 the proposed amendment is relevant only to Member States that have chosen to provide exemption for 
distributions as the option to use the credit method under Article 4(1)(b) remains unchanged 
31 COM (2013) 814 final, p.4 
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mismatches are treated in a cross-border context and what solutions of the problems caused 
by mismatches are provided by the existing legal systems.  
1.3 Method and Materials 
For the purpose of the research the traditional legal method will be used. Specifically, in order 
to clarify the issue of classification conflict from the perspective of different legal systems the 
research will be based on the study of the sources of law. The reference to the relevant 
existing academic literature will be made with the purpose to obtain valuable commentaries. 
In addition, soft law such as relevant reports from the OECD is found to give valuable input.  
The issue of compatibility with EU law will be considered through the study of the ECJ’s 
case-law. However, taking into account that there is no ECJ’s case-law related to the 
application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to hybrid financial instruments, the relevance 
of case-law is established on the ground of the legal articles, which have addressed the issue 
of hybrid financial instruments and domestic anti-hybrid rules. In addition, the choice of the 
relevant case-law is also defined basing on the possibility to draw a parallel between the tax 
problems, challenged by the ECJ, and the aim of the proposal in question. 
Decisions of some domestic cases are deemed to be relevant. Taking into account the lack of 
official English translation, it has been found necessary to resort to the secondary sources, 
which set out the decisions in English. 
1.4 Delimitation 
Firstly, the paper does not assess consequences of the proposed modification to anti-abuse 
rules of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. It is acknowledged that the proposal does not 
constitute the law and the amendment will be enacted only in case of unanimous support by 
all EU Member States. 
Secondly, the issue of hybrid entities, which are treated as opaque in one state and as 
transparent in another, is not going to be considered in this thesis. This issue was broadly 
discussed on the OECD report (1999) “The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
to Partnerships”, which led to important amendment of OECD Commentary (2000). The 
author is aware, that this report addressed the problem of treaty benefits, whereas the Action 
Plan on BEPS considers the problem also from the prospective of domestic law. However, 
taking into account that the core of this study is the proposed amendment to the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, it is regarded that hybrid financial instruments are more exposed to its 
consequences. Therefore, this thesis does not cover the issues related to hybrid entities. 
Thirdly, some countries have adopted anti-hybrid rules, which are not aimed at linking 
allowance for dividend exemption at the parent company level to the tax treatment of the 
correspondent profit distribution at the level of the payer’s state, but rather link allowance for 
deduction at the source state with the tax treatment in the parent company’s state.32 It is 
foreseeable that the coexistence of these rules, each being aimed at preventing double non-
taxation, will result in double taxation. However, the problem of “circularly-linked” rules is 
beyond consideration in this thesis. The rules countering deduction are recommended by 
OECD Action Plan on BEPS, whereas the rule tackling exemption has the higher priority due 
to the proposal of the Commission to amend the Parent – Subsidiary Directive. Some 
observations made by scholars could also support the author’s decision to focus on this latter 
rule. It has been concluded that the need for the capital lender to assess the tax treatment in 
every country in which the capital borrowers reside could lead to the high administration and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Denmark, the United Kingdom see to this end Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance 
Issues, OECD (2012), p.17 
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compliance cost. Therefore, “the OECD recommendation that the tax treatment at the level of 
the payer should refer to the tax treatment at the level of the recipient should be rejected”.33	  
1.5 Outline 
Chapter 2 of the thesis is aimed at giving insight into hybrid financial instruments with regard 
to the issue of debt - equity distinction and the classification approach. 
Then the paper proceeds to consider, in Chapter 3, the role of double tax treaties in dealing 
with the classification conflict using the OECD Model as an example.  
Chapter 4 focuses on tax implications of the cross-border transactions in the context of 
classification conflict in relation to hybrid financial instruments under the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive and the Interests and Royalty Directive.  
Compatibility of the proposed amendment with EU law are discussed in Chapter 5, which is 
followed by the final conclusions in Chapter 6. 
 	  
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 “The debt-equity bias” as a root of the problem 
According to the standard Modigliani-Miller (1968) theorem a firm is indifferent between 
financing either through issuing stocks (equity) or debt, under the assumption that there are no 
taxes, no asymmetric information and no bankruptcy and agency costs. But in reality firms 
deviate from this rule, mainly due to existence of taxes.34 
In accordance with the fundamental principle of taxation as neutrality, taxes should not 
influence taxpayers’ decisions. With respect to financial instruments, the most important 
neutrality consideration concerns the decision on different modes of finance (financial 
neutrality) such as new equity issues or debt capital.35 However, transactions on the debt side 
generally receive favorable treatment. Transactions on the equity side do not.36 Such a 
different tax treatment of debt and equity, i.e. “the debt-equity bias”,37 therefore, distorts 
financing decisions of corporations and induces financing through debt, rather than equity. 
This difference in treatment substantially infringes the concept of equal treatment under tax 
law and of neutrality from the viewpoint of public finance.38  
Although, there are no objective legal reasons to distinguish between both sources of 
financing.39 It is regarded that the rise in administrative complexity would rather call for a 
similar tax treatment. Consequently, it is likely that the distinction originates in an artificial 
distinction made by the traditional view that dividends were merely seen as the remuneration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 S. Bärsch & C. Spengel (n.5), p.526 
34 S. Fatica, T. Hemmelgarn, G. Nicodème, ‘The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: consequences and solutions’, Taxation 
Paper No 33 (2012) 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_papers/taxa
tion_paper_33_en.pdf accessed 19.04.2014 
35 S. Bärsch (n 4) pp.44-45 
36 while dividends are usually subject to taxation at the source state, interests are tax deductible. Nathan R. 
Christensen, ‘The Case for Reviewing Debt/Equity Determinations for Abuse of Discretion’, University of 
Chicago Law Review, Vol. 74, No 4 (2007), p.1315 
37 Commission, ‘Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2011’, European Economy, No 5 (2011), p. 56 
38 W. Schön (n 1) p.490 
39 S. Fatica, T. Hemmelgarn, G. Nicodème (n 34) p.6   
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of capital while interest payment constitutes a business cost.40 In addition, the concept of 
income as a tax base does not require this divide at all.41 On the other hand, it is discussed 
among the scholars that necessity for the tax legislator to make additional choices and 
existence of a wide range of additional specifics in national tax systems contribute to the 
relevance of the debt-equity distinction.42 
Correcting the debt bias may well lead to beneficial effects.43 For instance, Schön considers 
that with regard to the sophisticated techniques for tax arbitrage, abolition of the distinction 
between debt and equity turns to be a practical necessity for the smooth functioning of 
national and international tax law.44 However, he recognizes that with a view to the current 
tax policies around the world the debt-equity distinction for the time being is inevitable.45 
2.2 Classification of hybrid financial instruments 
The different combinations of financial elements (risks and rewards) and other entitlements 
(voting rights, cancellation rights, conversion rights, etc.) lead to a vast number of possible 
financial instruments. 46 The spectrum of hybrid instruments ranges from corporate shares 
with features typical of loans (such as certain preference shares) to loans with features usually 
associated with equity investments (such as participation in profit and loss). Such equity-type 
loans would include inter alia jouissance rights, silent partnerships, participation bonds, 
convertible bonds, warrant bonds, profit participation loans and preference shares.47  
As an example, a widely used hybrid financial instrument is the “profit- participating loan” 
(PPL). Countries such as Belgium, France, Spain, Hungary usually classify PPL under civil 
law as a debt, and, consequently, the payment made in relation to the loan is deductible.  
Whereas countries such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands consider that this instrument is 
similar to a shareholding in a subsidiary and, consequently, the payment made in relation to 
this instrument can be classified as dividend. 48 It has been found that such a scheme has 
proliferated in respect of the Netherlands – Hungary double tax convention.49 
As it has been pointed out above, classification of the payment is the matter of the internal 
law.  To this end, member states have adopted different tax classification approaches based on 
case law, civil law classification and/or accounting law. However, such formal adherence to 
the concept of debt and equity under civil law and corporate law is criticized for missing the 
underlying rationale of the debt-equity divide in the world of corporate income taxation and 
also for the inappropriateness in the context of international allocation of taxing right.50 It 
could be argued that distinction between debt and equity shall be made basing on the 
economic substance of rights and obligations with its most important distinctive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid p.6 with reference to M. Devereux & A. Gerritsen, The tax treatment of debt and equity, in: D.A. 
Albregtse & P. Kavelaars, Naar een Europese Winstbelasting, Deventer: Kluwer 2010 
41 W. Schön (n 1) p.492 
42 W. Schön (n 1) pp.492-493 
43 S. Fatica, T. Hemmelgarn, G. Nicodème (n 34) p.6 
44 W. Schön (n 1) p.491 
45 W. Schön (n 1) p.502 
46 W. Schön (n 1) p.491; S. Bärsch (n 4) p.82 
47 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin ‘National Tax Policy, the Directives and Hybrid Finance. Options for tax 
policy in the context of the treatment of Hybrid Financial Instruments in the Parent- Subsidiary Directive and the 
Interest and Royalties Directive’. Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination, 16. SFB International 
Tax Coordination, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna (2006), p.5 
48 see to this effect, http://www.belastingrechtaandevu.nl/Portals/0/images/Boulogne_artikel20_Engels.pdf p.2-3  
49 TAXUD D1 D(2012), Summary report of the responses received on the public consultation on 
factual examples and possible ways to tackle double non-taxation cases, 5 July 2012, p.15 
50 W. Schön (n 1) pp.495-496 
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characteristics. For this purpose S. Bärsch51 indicated an appropriate array(s) of rights and 
obligations by means of which economic substance of a financial instrument can be classified 
either as debt or equity (see Annex A). It demonstrates the divergence of distinctive elements 
of pure debt and pure equity, which could give first indications on which form prevails more 
than another one. He expresses the view that if such arrays of rights and obligations are 
agreed upon, pure equity and pure debt exist, which may conduce to the further analysis for 
the tax purposes and should give first indications whether a hybrid financial instruments 
substitutes one form more than another.52  
 	  
3. CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF OECD 
MODEL 
3.1 Relevance 
Taking into account the foregoing discussion two points have to be highlighted. First, each 
EU country treats hybrid financial instruments within the frames of its domestic tax law 
according to its sovereign powers. Second, tax classification of the payment made under 
hybrid financial instrument as interest or dividend is crucial for the allocation of taxing 
rights.53 However, the influence of double tax treaties on the taxation in a cross-border 
context is of great importance. This is based on the fact that income tax treaties are capable to 
limit the legitimate taxing right of each contracting state, which is, within the limits of 
international law, widely sovereign in levying taxes.54 
With a view to the great number of income tax treaties and for the purpose of this research, 
the OECD Model is taken as a basis since the majority of bilateral tax treaties are based on it.  
Coming out of the fact that the remuneration from hybrid financial instruments is generally 
classified either as dividends or interests, Art 10 and Art 11 respectively are relevant for 
consideration.  With regard to the derivatives, Art 21 (other income) becomes highly relevant, 
but in general it exceptionally applies to capital-raising financial instruments. Art. 13 (capital 
gains) could be also ignored, as it covers gains from the alienation of hybrid financial 
instruments, but not the remuneration derived therefrom. Further, Art 7 (business profit) is 
relevant in case if the capital lender carries on business in the source state through a PE and 
interest and dividends paid are effectively connected with this PE. 55 Therefore, for the 
purpose of this thesis the study is limited by Art 10 and Art 11. 
3.2 Tax effect 
Taxing rights of contracting states differ depending on the category of the income item. Both 
Art 10 and Art 11 grant unlimited taxing rights to the resident state whereas the taxing rights 
of the source state are limited by the fixed rate of withholding tax depending on the category 
of income.56 In this way, contracting states retain certain liberty in defining the amount of 
withholding tax to be retained by the source state. It has been observed, however, that more 
frequently applied double tax treaties deny the source right to levy withholding tax in cases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 S. Bärsch (n 4) 
52 S. Bärsch (n 4) pp.82-84 
53 S. Bärsch (n 4) p.2 
54 S. Bärsch (n 4) p.94 
55 S. Bärsch (n 4) p.94 
56 OECD Model (2010), Article 10 allows 5% withholding tax if the beneficial owner is a company which holds 
directly at least 25%; 15 % in other cases. Article 11 allows 10% withholding tax.  
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for interest payment than for dividends. Therefore, the classification of the remuneration paid 
under hybrid financial instrument is deciding in whether withholding tax can be levied or in 
what amount.57  It should be noted that when a source state does not impose a withholding tax 
to interests payment made in case of the hybrid mismatch, the taxpayer can end up with triple 
non-taxation (white income).58  
3.3 Interpretation of Articles  
It is generally regarded that the tax treaty classification is independent of domestic tax law 
classification. 59  According to Lang 60  each double tax treaty has to be interpreted 
autonomously, that is to say independent from the national tax law of the contracting states as 
long as no direct reference to the national law of one of the contracting state is made.  Thus, 
further it will be considered whether the definitions of dividend and interest are exhaustive 
and independent of the domestic law. 
3.3.1 Dividend definition under Article 10(3) 
Definition of dividends under OECD Model can be divided into three groups. The first two 
groups include “income from shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining 
shares, founders’ shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits…”61. 
This dividends’ definition constitute autonomous parts and shall be interpreted independent 
from the national law of the source state.62  
The third part of definition includes “income from other corporate rights which is subjected to 
the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the 
company making the distribution is a resident”63. In contrast to the definition of first groups, 
income from other corporate rights is affected by the reference to the national law of the 
source state, therefore making this law to be a part of the treaty between two contracting 
states.64 To this end, the source state is entitled to classify the payment made in connection 
with hybrid instrument in accordance to its domestic tax laws. However, it is questionable that 
the reference to the source state internal law in Art 10(3) could serve as an indication for the 
residence state of an income recipient to accept the classification of the source state under an 
income classification conflict. And the concern that lies behind this is related to the 
interpretation of the term “corporate right”.  
Being guided by the meaning of dividends, it could be concluded that the term “corporate 
rights” is a distinctive element for the qualification of income as dividends.65 Accordingly, 
only the remuneration derived from corporate rights can be expected to fulfill the dividend 
definition.66 In such a way, the term “corporate right” plays a crucial role for the dividend 
definition. However, since the term is not defined in OECD Model, its interpretation shall be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin, ‘Taxation of Cross border Hybrid Finance. A legal Analysis.’ Discussion 
Papers SFB International Tax Coordination, 27. SFB International Tax Coordination, WU Vienna University of 
Economics and Business, Vienna, (2007), p.9 
58 null withholding tax on interests could be fixed either under domestic tax law or under a double tax treaty. 
Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) pp.5,7 
59 M. Helminen, ‘Classification of Cross-Border Payments on Hybrid Instruments’, Bulletin for International 
Taxation, Vol.58, No 2 (2004), p.57 
60 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.9 with further citing  
61 Art. 10(3) 
62 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.10 with further citing 
63 Art. 10(3) 
64 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.10 with further citing 
65 R. Tomazela Santos, ‘Tax Treaty Qualification of Income Derived from Hybrid Financial Instruments’, 
Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol.67, No 10 (2013), p.4 
66 S. Bärsch (n 4) p.99 
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made in accordance with the rule of Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model, i.e. in accordance with the 
law of the state applying the treaty, unless the context otherwise requires.67 
To this effect, the resident state of the income recipient has the right to invoke its own law to 
determine whether the income has derived from the corporate rights. If it ends up by 
concluding that the hybrid financial instrument does not constitute the corporate right, then 
the residence state may deny the dividend treatment of the corresponding payment and 
classify it as interest for the tax purpose. As a result, double taxation will arise.68 
Therefore, there is no obligation under OECD Model for the resident state to accept the 
dividend treatment of the source state. 
3.3.2 Further Comments  
The Commentary on Art 10 seems to accept a lack of fully and exhaustive definition and 
explains this by “the great differences between the laws of OECD member countries”. 
Consequently, the notion of dividends is still closely connected with domestic laws of each 
member country “in view of the still remaining dissimilarities between Member countries in 
the field of company law and taxation law”.69   
As pointed out by van Weegel hybrid instruments is a particular area where the lack of 
exhaustive definition or the reference to the domestic laws leads to troublesome 
conclusions.70   
Helminen upholds that the classification conflict such as the one described in Sec. 3.3.1is the 
best avoided when the treaties deviate from the OECD Model. More specifically, when 
double tax treaties do not use the term “corporate rights” in the third part of the dividend 
definition, which refers to the source-state classification, the residence state is required to 
accept the source state dividend classification of the payment on hybrids.71 For instance, it has 
been found that the Germany - United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty refers in the third 
part of the dividends definition to the «other income from other rights». 72  Helminen 
also points out that under the Nordic Convention treatment as dividends does not require the 
existence of corporate rights, which reduces the danger of unresolved classification conflicts, 
as compared to the OECD Model.73 
By the same token, Tomazela Santos supports the idea of eliminating the reference to 
domestic legislation for dividend definition through an exhaustive and full definition, which 
would provide greater legal certainty.74 
By contrast to the above, a more general opinion also exists stating that the tax treaty 
qualification of the income needs to co-exist with the domestic tax qualification of the 
income; as uniform treaty qualification may not solve all conflicts arising from the interaction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 M. Helminen (n 59) p.58 
68 M. Helminen (n 59) p.61 
69 OECD Commentary 2010, par.23 to Article 10 
70 van Weeghel, S., ‘Dividends (Article 10 OECD Model Convention)’, p.67 in Michael Lang, ‘Source versus 
Residence’, Kluwer Law International BV, the Netherlands, 2008 
71 M. Helminen (n 59) p.61  
72 Article 10(5) of Germany - United States Income and Capital Tax Treaty (as amended through 2006) 
73 M. Helminen, ‘Dividends, Interest and Royalties under the Nordic Multilateral Double Taxation Convention’, 
Bulletin for International. Taxation, Vol. 61, No 2 (2007), p.55 
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between the tax regimes of both contracting States plus the requirements of the treaty upon 
each of them.75  
3.3.3 Interest definition under Article 11 (3) 
Unlike the definition of dividends, Article 11 (3) of OECD Model does not contain any 
reference to the source state income classification. The definition of interests is limited to the 
“income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or 
not carrying a right to participate in the debtor’s profits”. Therefore it has to be recognized as 
a final and all-embracing definition of the term interest,76 which restricts the qualification 
competence of the source state to the precise terms of the treaty provision.77 
The decisive element of the interest definition is the expression “income from debt-claims of 
every kind”. The expression is not defined in the Model or Commentaries and just followed 
by the exemplary enumeration of certain kinds of debt claims, which does not influence the 
universal character of the term itself.78  
3.3.4 Interconnection of Article 10 and Article 11 
It has been illustrated that OECD Model provides for different approaches in defining of 
interests and dividends. In this respect the question which classification must prevail has to be 
raised.  
Some suggestions could be interfered from the OECD Commentary. Paragraph 19 of the 
Commentaries on Art 11 envisages the possibility of overlap between the categories of 
income and therefore it clarifies that the term “interest” does not include items of income, 
which are dealt with under Art 10. Consequently, for - limited or not - tax treaty purposes 
dividend income classification takes precedence over interest income classification. 79 
Therefore if the income from financial instruments by falling within qualification as corporate 
rights, classifies as dividend under Art 10 of the OECD Model, such yield cannot fall under 
Art 11 of the OECD Model even if it would qualify as interest in terms of Art 11, as the terms 
of income from corporate rights and income from debt claims are mutually exclusive.80  
However, it turns to be challenging to come out to a safety answer what qualification shall 
prevail when the same income from hybrid financial instrument is treated as a dividend 
income under domestic law of the source state and as an interest income under terms of Art 
11.81 According to the Commentary the dividend definition shall take precedence. On the 
other hand, it has been observed that the closed treaty definitions of interests should prevail 
over open treaty definitions of dividends “in order to favor homogeneous and international tax 
treaty definitions of income”.82 
3.4 Counteracting measures under OECD Model 
Even though the residence state is not bound to follow the source state classification of the 
payment made under hybrid financial instrument, OECD Model provides specific tools to the 
residence state to deal with the consequences of the classification conflict.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 F.A.G. Prats, ‘Qualification Of Hybrid Financial Instruments In Tax Treaties’, Diritto E Pratica Tributaria 
Internazionale, Vol. VIII, No 3 (2011), p.988 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2257065 
accessed 10.04.2014 
76 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.12 with further citing 
77 R. Tomazela Santos (n 65) p.6 citing A. Xavier (2010) 
78 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.12 
79 F.A.G. Prats (n 75) p.986 
80 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.12 with further citing 
81 F.A.G. Prats (n 75) p.986 
82 Ibid p.987 
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Double non-taxation resulted from the classification inconsistency may be solved through Art. 
23A(4).83 The objective of this provision according to the Commentaries is to “avoid double 
non taxation as a result of disagreements between the State of residence and the State of 
source on the facts of a case or on the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention”.84 It 
entitles the resident state to switch from the exemption method and to tax the income in cases 
where the source state applies the provisions of the convention to exempt such income or 
applied to such income reduced tax rate on dividends or interests. In view of the nature of the 
provision, it is relevant for countries, which have adopted the exemption method to provide 
double taxation relief. However, it cannot be concluded for certain that countries, which use 
the exemption method, actually have adopted this provision in their tax treaties.85 Moreover, 
notwithstanding that these clauses could eliminate double non-taxation, they are found to be 
more restrictive on taxpayers and therefore within EU they could be adverse to the 
fundamental freedoms of TFEU.86 On the other hand, one could notice that in Columbus 
Container87 the ECJ ruled that the switch-over clause was compatible with the fundamental 
freedoms. 
Following on the Commentaries on Art.23,88 Par. 1 of the Art. 23(A) can also work per se as 
a switch-over clause in cases of “negative qualification” by interpreting the meaning “may be 
taxed in the other contracting state”.89 It implies that the state of residence is not required to 
exempt the income where the source state is precluded to execute its taxing rights as a result 
of the treaty interpretation and therefore, the State of residence should consider that the item 
of income may not be taxed by the State of source in accordance with the provisions of the 
convention. Consequently, it could be in general inferred that under the OECD Commentary 
the residence state is not bound by the treaty classification of the income made by the source 
State, but rather by the result of such a classification made by the source State.90 
Another alternative to eliminate double non-taxation caused by the different interpretation and 
application of either the double tax treaty or by the simultaneous application of the domestic 
tax laws of the Member States is to accompany the exemption method by a "subject to tax" 
clause, which ensures application of exemption method to the extent that the correspondent 
income was effectively taxed in a source state. Also, the Commission, in addressing issues of 
aggressive tax planning, has encouraged Member States to include this clause in double 
taxation conventions in order to ensure that commitment of one contracting state not to tax a 
given item of income shall apply where the item is subject to tax in the other contracting 
State. 91 
3.5 Final Remarks  
In the light of the foregoing it could be resumed that a tax treaty based on the current version 
of OECD Model is not an adequate tool to solve the qualification conflict92 and the reference 	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No 6 (2012), p.320 
86 Commission, ‘Summary report of the responses received on the public consultation on 
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92 Eberhartinger, Eva and Six, Martin (2007) (n 57) p.13 
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to the domestic law in case of dividend definition seems to be accepted as a natural condition 
for the application of the double tax treaties. However, with the view that the tax treaty 
qualification is valid for determination of the allocation taxing rights and it does not cover and 
does not necessarily impact domestic tax regime (e.g., timing issues and criteria being used 
for realization of income, determination of the deductibility or the non- deductibility of 
certain payments as cost), it could be concluded that the tax treaty qualification serves a very 
limited purpose. To this end, a mandatory and universal qualification of the income under a 
double tax treaty does not necessarily lead to the coherent tax treatment of a cross-border 
transaction.93 
Elimination of double taxation is inherent to the double tax treaties, but the issue of double 
non-taxation has been subject to intense debate recently. It is discussed that the objective of 
tax treaties de lege lata is not preventing double non-taxation as Contracting States may 
anticipate. It is a widely held view that the OECD Model neither clearly states what is the 
position of the Model itself, nor contains specific measures to counteract or prevent double 
non-taxation.94 In this respect, EU law does not also restrict double non-taxation caused by 
tax treaties.95 
It is worth to emphasize that BEPS Action 6 (Prevent Treaty Abuse)96 proposes to clarify that 
tax treaties shall not be used with the target to generate double non-taxation. For this purpose 
it is suggested that the title and preamble of the OECD Model shall be amended as to state 
clearly that the prevention of tax evasion and avoidance is a purpose of tax treaties.97 It is 
assumed that clear statement of the signatories’ intention will be relevant to the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of the treaty.98 However, the commentators express another 
opinion. It is observed that tax treaties are aimed “to facilitate cross-border trade and 
investment through the removal of barriers to investment, including double taxation” and 
therefore, it is risky to state that the purpose of tax treaties is to prevent abuse of treaties.99 
They should not be used as an anti-avoidance tool and the only avoidance to be addressed in 
treaties should be where benefits are obtained under the Treaty in an artificial manner.100 This 
idea seems to be relevant for the further discussion of the denial of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive benefits.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 F.A.G. Prats (n 75) p.983 
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4. TAXATION OF HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS UNDER EU 
LAW 
4.1 General remarks 
In the previous chapter it has been discussed that the application of double tax treaties has a 
limited impact on the tax treatment of hybrid financial instruments.   
At the present stage of EU law in the area of direct taxation Member States are free to design 
their tax systems in accordance with the domestic policy objectives and requirements as long 
as the domestic tax rules do not constitute a forbidden discrimination or restriction under the 
TFEU. 101  Consequently, EU law does not have an effect on classification of hybrid 
instruments made under domestic tax rules. However, on the other hand, the Member States’ 
autonomy in the area of direct taxation is restricted both by secondary EU law in the form of 
directives, which are used to advance the Single Market, and primary EU law such as the 
fundamental freedoms, which eliminate disadvantages of cross-border transactions in 
comparison with the purely domestic transactions.102 
In a cross-border context in terms of taxation of hybrid financial instruments the Parent- 
Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive103 are of the most relevance as the 
remuneration from the hybrid instruments may fall within competence of one of them. 
Therefore, further it is aimed at analyzing in what way the current versions of the indicated 
Directives affect the classification and taxation of the remuneration paid under hybrid 
instruments. 
4.2 Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
The aim of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is to facilitate the grouping together of companies 
at Union level.104 The benefits of the Directive apply to distributions of profits by a subsidiary 
to a parent company by virtue of an association between the companies.105  However, the term 
“profit distribution” is not specified in the Directive. This creates a number of uncertainties by 
leaving it for the Member States and their national definitions to decide which profits to 
include within the scope of the national application of the directive.106 
In clarifying the context of the notion “profit distribution” it has been, however, 
acknowledged that this term is somewhat broader than the term “dividend” and should cover 
any payment by the subsidiary to the parent company based on the shareholder-company 
relationship or the association between the companies.107 
Notably, that there is no ECJ or national court case-law concerning the clarification of the 
notion “profit distribution.108 As a result, since harmonization in EU law requires for the 	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definition, which would be independent from the definitions of dividends in internal law and 
bilateral tax treaties, 109  scholars have extensively discussed the degree of the term 
interpretation autonomy. While many scholars have concluded that the definition requires an 
autonomous interpretation, at the same time they have been reluctant to recognize an 
autonomous understanding that this definition is totally independent from the domestic law 
meanings.110 As a result, it is preferable for the ECJ to lay down certain criteria that may be 
applied by national authorities within the framework of their national systems of company 
taxation.111 
One of the main concern outlined in the discussion is whether the interest on hybrid debt 
treated as dividends under domestic law of the source state shall be qualified as distributed 
profits under Art 1 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and whether the participation via hybrid 
instruments shall be attributable to the holding level required under Art 3. This is of particular 
importance in the light of the purpose of the Directive to eliminate double taxation112. 
Exclusion of the interest on hybrid debt treated as dividends under domestic law of the source 
state from the scope of the Directive could lead to multiple taxation because the source state 
will deny the deductibility of the remuneration due to the domestic classification whereas the 
resident state will not apply the provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and will also tax 
the payment made under hybrid financial instrument.    
 
Within the framework of this paper the debate on the applicability of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive to the interests on hybrid debt, which are treated as dividends in the source state, is 
summarized briefly with the purpose to illustrate the existence of loopholes.  
 
To recapitulate, since the source state treats payments on hybrid instruments as dividends 
under national tax law, one cannot withdraw benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to 
such payments. However, there is no definite conclusion on whether the state of residence of 
the parent company has to accept the classification of the source state and therefore grant the 
benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive symmetrically.113 Although, it is accepted that the 
parent state cannot be required to accept the qualification of the source state in any event, 
since this would give the source state too much power to collect tax revenues in comparison 
to the state of residence of an income recipient.114 But there are compelling arguments to do 
so at least in the following two cases115: 1) if, in the opposite situation, the residence state 
itself would have reclassified the payment on hybrid instrument as dividend; 2) if the 
residence state has to accept a dividend treatment for tax treaty purposes.  
 
*  *  * 
It is relevant to emphasize that the current version of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive left the 
door open for the (economic) double taxation in a situation, when a source state classifies the 
payment as a dividend and a residence state of the parent company classifies it as an interest. 
No uniform guidelines to the interpretation of the term “profit distribution” and existence of 
the classification conflict facilitate existing of the double taxation.116 To the best of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid with reference to B.J.M. Terra and P.J. Wattel, European Tax Law, 3rd edition (Deventer: Kluwer, 
2001), pp. 354 et seq 
110 J. Bundgaard (2010) (n 107) p.447, see footnotes 46, 54 
111 J. Bundgaard (2010) (n 107) p.448 with further citing  
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author’s knowledge, this problem has not been raised in the current discussion of the 
Directive, therefore setting unequal approaches to handling the Single Market problems. 
 
In addition, interpretation of the tax treaty and Commentaries on the OECD Model in order to 
solve the classification problem under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is a very controversial 
approach, which could have undesirable and far-reaching effects.117 
4.3 Interest and Royalties Directive (“Interest Directive”) 
The Directive definition of the interest mirrors the one embodied in Art. 11 of the OECD 
Model. At first sight it appears particularly wide, but at the same the Article 4 of the Interest 
Directive allows the Member State, where the interest arises, to deny the application of the 
Directive in certain specific cases.118 For the purpose of the paper cases stipulated by articles 
4 (b) – (d) are relevant. 
Article 4(b) allows one to deny the Directive benefits in respect of income from profit-sharing 
loans, e.g. loans where the interest rate is typically linked to the borrower’s profit. Article 4(c) 
and 4(d) refer to specific typologies of debt instrument that carry a certain equity-related 
element (“quasi-equity”).119 
It is regarded that these Articles apply in cases where the treatment under the domestic tax 
law of the source state corresponds to the general definition of interest states in the 
Directive.120 Therefore, payment under debt claims may still be characterized as interest under 
the domestic laws of the source state but may nonetheless be subject to withholding tax on 
interest in the same state.121  
In this way, as Distasso/Russo assumed that the Interest Directive aims to “hit” those hybrid 
instruments that create a tax deduction in the source state and which give rise to an exemption 
from taxation of the correspondent income in the residence state, which classifies the 
corresponding payment as a profit distribution and therefore, extends the benefits of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive to it.122 However, it has been argued that even if the elimination 
of double non-taxation was the ration behind Art 4, the provision does not constitute adequate 
and reliable instrument. When the resident state treats the payment symmetrically as an 
interest, application of the Article results in double taxation.123 
Similarly, the amendment of Art 4 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on a unilateral basis 
could facilitate arising of (judicial) double taxation in a situation, when the source state treats 
the payment as interest under domestic tax law, but withdraws benefits of the Interest 
Directive based on Art 4, whereas the resident state also withdraws the benefits of Parent-
Subsidiary Directive on the ground of the payment deductibility in the source state (see Annex 
B - Figure 1). It is getting more complicated with a view that the resident state is not obliged 
to credit the withholding tax, which is not permitted under its interpretation of the double tax 
treaty.124     
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By contrast, one could argue that companies are well aware of the risk and usually choose a 
source state with no withholding tax on foreign interests or with double tax treaty that 
establishes a null withholding tax rate in that state. Therefore, the denying of the benefits of 
the Interest Directive does not have the real effect. However, this argument seems to be too 
precipitate to rely on in order to create a “level playing field” as designed by the legislators.  
4.4 Effect of the current version of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on hybrid 
financial instruments 
It seems that the Commission proposal on amendment of Parent-Subsidiary Directive is based 
on the firm assumption that under the current version of the Directive Member States always 
have to grant participation exemption, even if the source state does not tax the correspondent 
profit distribution. 
This Section will consider the question whether the current version of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive provides for any solutions capable to ensure exclusion of financial instruments with 
“negative” classification from the scope of the Directive. 
As the starting point for consideration, it is established case-law that the application of the 
exemption method set out in Art 4(1) in the current version of Parent-Subsidiary Directive “is 
not subordinated to any condition and is expressly subject only to Articles 4(2) and (3) and 
1(2) of that directive”.125 From this perspective and for the purpose of this Section, Art 1(2) is 
relevant and will be considered first. 
4.4.1 Effect of the “fraud and abuse” clause of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive  
The question considered further is whether the Directive provision on applicability of 
domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of fraud or abuse126 could 
serve as an efficient way to exclude hybrid instruments, which are treated as debt at a source 
Member State, from the scope of the Directive benefits. 
 
However, it is questionable that deductibility on the level of a paying company resulted from 
different qualification as a result of simultaneous application of autonomous classification 
methods undertaken by Member States as a part of their autonomy in respect of tax policy in 
the area of direct taxation, constitutes fraud or abuse. There is also lack of evidence that 
double non-taxation created by this kind of disparities in tax classification could be regarded 
as abusive. J. Schwarz 127  considers that the expression of double non-taxation is 
“conceptually dubious” and it is “an obvious consequence of the exercise in parallel by 
Member States of their fiscal sovereignty”.  
The abuse of law doctrine in EU law implies creation of wholly artificial arrangement, which 
is not always the case when hybrid financial instruments are used. The more detailed 
consideration on applicability of abuse of law concept to the hybrid financial instruments is 
considered in Section 5.5.2 hereof. However, it is justified to conclude that the “fraud and 
abuse” clause of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive provides for the opportunity to exclude from 
the benefits of the Directive only those hybrid financial arrangements, which constitute 
wholly artificial arrangements.  
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4.4.2 Effect of the “Subject to” tax clause 
One could consider that the profit distribution made by a paying company, which has 
deducted the yield on hybrid instruments, is not covered by the Directive on the ground of the 
“subject to” tax clause in Art 2 (a)(iii) of the Directive. This Article states that company 
within the meaning of the Directive shall constitute any company, which is subject to one of 
the taxes listed in Annex I, Part B, without the possibility of an option or of being exempt. 
Therefore, tax-exempt entities do not come under the scope of application of the directive.128 
One could argue that the distributed profits would not effectively be subject to tax since 
deductibility of the yield on hybrid instruments can economically be seen as a credit of the 
taxes paid on these profits when they were earned.129 However, this argument cannot be 
considered to be in line with the “subject to” tax clause, as this clause requires not profit to be 
subject to tax, but rather the distributing company.130 It is implied that the company in 
principle is subject to tax in the source state, irrespective of the level of taxation, even though 
in practice no taxes would be paid for example because of a loss year or because of another 
reason.131 And although the deduction reduces the overall tax liability, it does not mean that 
the company is exempt from company tax.132 
 
4.4.3 “Association” requirement 
Benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive are applicable “[w]here a parent company or its 
permanent establishment, by virtue of the association of the parent company with its 
subsidiary,	   receives distributed profits…”133. In the tax literature it is argued that insofar as 
hybrid instrument do not involve company law participation 134 , the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive do not cover these forms. It is based on the understanding that the profit 
distributions shall be linked to a participation of the receiving company in the issued share 
capital of the distributing company.135 
 
*      *      * 
It can be inferred that the current wording of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not provide 
an effective solution on how to exclude from its scope the hybrid financial instruments, which 
give rise to unintended double non-taxation. It could be concluded that only arrangements, 
which constitute abusive practices, could be legitimately excluded. The Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive does not also cover hybrid instruments, which do not involve company law 
participation. Notably, that the latter form of hybrid instruments will still not be covered by 
the amendment to the Art 4(1) of the Directive. 
 
4.5 Amendment as a platform for domestic anti-hybrid rules 
Some EU countries have already implemented anti-hybrid rules, which deny dividend 
participation when the correspondent payment has been deducted by a source state.136 OECD 	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BEPS Action Plan 137 also calls Member States to implement “linking rules” in order 
neutralize effect of hybrid mismatch.  In this respect the scholars have raised the question if 
these rules are compatible with the current version of the Directive. It is not aimed to analyze 
the issue of compatibility in details, however, it is noteworthy that the general opinion 
reached is that domestic anti-hybrid rules are in conflict with the current wording of the 
Directive as they are not fit in exemptions prescribed by it.138 In this way, the amendment of 
the Directive will ensure compliance of domestic rules with the secondary EU law. 
The next Chapter proceeds to consider whether the amendment to the Article 4(1) of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive will collide with the fundamental freedoms. 
 	  
5. COMPATIBILITY WITH EU LAW 
5.1 General Remarks 	  
It is assumed that “measures of the Community institutions are in principle presumed to be 
lawful”.139 However when secondary EU law is in conflict with the treaty freedoms it should 
be set aside, but the actual cases challenge national implementing legislation.140 Therefore, 
options granted by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive do not grant immunity to the domestic law 
that exercises such option. 141 Following Ouzo, for reasons of legal certainty secondary law 
may be invalidated only in “quite extreme situations». 142 
To this end, if the amendment of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is adopted, domestic law, 
which will deny dividend participation exemption on the grounds of deductibility of the 
correspondent payment in a payer’s Member State, must be implemented in accordance with, 
inter alia, the fundamental freedoms, thereby avoiding any discrimination in respect of cross-
border situations compared to domestic settings. 
Moreover, the principle of equal treatment based on consistent and well-established case law 
requires equal situations to be treated equally. In order to assess whether the principle has 
been complied with, the ECJ has developed a number of tests. The first step includes 
comparability test in order to establish whether the situations are comparable. The next step is 
to verify whether the distinction in treatment (if any) is reasonable, which implies justification 
test. And in the end, proportionality test shall be held. If a tax rule passes these tests, there is 
no prohibited discrimination.143 
Before proceeding to the compatibility analysis it is intended to raise the question whether a 
taxpayer can actually suffer from the application of “linking rule”, secured by the amendment 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.  	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5.2 Impediments behind denying of the participation exemption  
One could raise reasonable doubts under which conditions the “linking rule” could cause a 
disadvantage for a resident parent company in a cross-border situation in comparison with a 
domestic one. As the law stands now it could be even argued that a domestic transaction is in 
a less favorable situation, as the dividend payment is subject to the corporate tax whereas a 
cross-border transaction involving hybrid financial instrument escapes any corporate tax 
under “negative” classification conflict. To this end, the amendment of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive seeks to neutralize the tax effect of hybrid financial instruments mismatch as well as 
it presumes that in this way a cross-border situation and a domestic situation will be treated 
equally (see Annex C, Figure 1). 
However, from the perspective of the group of companies, which includes non-resident 
subsidiaries, the additional tax burden might arise in comparison with a wholly domestic 
group. This especially holds true with a view to the different tax rates in Member States. For 
example, if the tax value of a deductible dividend is less than the tax value of the participation 
exemption. 144 Another example of the impediment includes economic double taxation. It 
arises when the lower corporate income tax rate is applicable in the state of a first-tier non-
resident subsidiary, which treats the payment as deductible, while income is distributed by the 
second-tier subsidiary from the third country that treats payment as non-deductible and 
applies a tax rate higher than the one in the state of a first-tier subsidiary.145 The example (see 
Annex C, Figure 2 – Option A) illustrates that in the situation described above the proposed 
amendment may result in additional tax burden since the tax paid by the second-tier 
subsidiary on the non-deductible distribution will not be taken into account by the parent 
company, which tax the payment on the ground of its deductibility by the firs-tier subsidiary. 
It is worth mentioning that if the parent company switched to the credit method instead of full 
taxation (Option B), the economic double taxation would be prevented.  
In the light of this example, it could be inferred that from the perspective of the group of 
companies, there is a possibility that the taxpayer could find himself in a less favourable 
situation compared with a domestic situation.   
5.3 Applicable Freedom 
It is settled case law that the tax treatment of dividends may fall within Article 49 TFEU on 
freedom of establishment and Article 63 TFEU on the free movement of capital.146 Freedom 
of establishment would apply if the participation confers on the shareholder definite influence 
over the decisions of the company paying the dividends and allow him to determine the 
company’s activities.147 Portfolio investments must be examined exclusively in light of the 
free movement of capital.148 The same hold true for the third countries situation,149 however 
the scope of the Parent-subsidiary Directive is limited to EU companies. If a national measure 
has restrictive effects on both the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital, 
then the effect on the free movement of capital would have to be seen as an unavoidable 
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consequence of a restriction on freedom of establishment and would not justify an 
independent examination of that measure in the light of the free movement of capital.150  
 
The wording of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive establishes minimum 10% holding in the 
capital of a subsidiary for qualification to the Directive benefits,151 however leaves an option 
for the Member States to replace, by means of bilateral agreement, the criterion of the 
holding.152  
If the national rules make dividend exemption subject to the existence of a minimum 
shareholding of 10%, then one could question if this threshold could constitute definite 
influence. The ECJ found that holdings amounting to less than 10% of the latter’s capital do 
not confer the ability to exert a definite influence on the companies' decisions and to 
determine their activities.153Similarly, the support that a 10% shareholding is a controlling 
shareholding within the meaning of the freedom of establishment can be found in the decision 
of the German Federal Fiscal Court.154 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that if 
participation exemption is applied where a shareholding amounts to at least 10%, then 
denying of exemption shall be tested against freedom of establishment. With regard to 
portfolio investment (holdings of less than 10%), the right to free movement of capital shall 
be applicable.155 
Therefore, the way, in which the Directive is implemented into the national legislation, could 
define which freedom is applicable. For the purpose of this paper the further consideration 
will be held from the perspective of a standard requirement of 10% minimum shareholding 
and hence, in the light of freedom of establishment. 
 
5.4 Existence of different comparable situations 
According to the established case - law one could note that in order to establish the existence 
of a restriction the ECJ gives preference to the assessment on a standalone basis rather than 
from the perspective of a whole group.156 As a result, the following discussion is taken from 
the perspective of a parent company alone. 
5.4.1 Same treatment? 
The linking rules do not refer explicitly to cross-border situations. However, it is unlikely that 
a mismatch in a qualification will arise in domestic context, thus one could infer that “the 
application of the matching principle is de facto limited to cross border situations”.157 
For instance, in Lankhorst-Hohorst158 the Finanzgerich contended that the rule at issue was 
not directly linked to nationality159 and therefore, there was no less favourable treatment 
based on the residence of the shareholder. However, the Court established that 	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notwithstanding that fact a German rule constituted restriction to the freedom of 
establishment.160  
On the other hand, one cannot but notice that in Kerckhaert-Morres161 the Court did not find 
that the Belgium tax law, resulted in juridical double taxation, amounted to restriction of the 
free movement of capital since the Belgian tax legislation did not make any distinction 
between dividends from companies established in Belgium and dividends from companies 
established in another Member State. Under Belgian law both were taxed at an identical rate 
of 25% by way of income tax.162 It is noteworthy, that the ECJ’s decision has been found 
disappointing from an Internal Market perspective, and it was subject to criticism on multiple 
levels.163 
Columbus Container164 has a significant resemblance to Kerckhaert-Morres165. The German 
case dealt with the switch over from the exemption to the credit method in case of a hybrid 
entity with a low taxation in Belgium, the Court also found that the legislation at issue did not 
constitute tax disadvantage for a non-resident partnership in comparison with domestic 
partnerships and consequently, there was no discrimination resulting from a difference in 
treatment between those two categories of partnerships. 166  Despite the fact that the 
replacement of the exemption method by the set-off method increased the tax burden of 
partners by 53%167, the Court stated that the legislation merely subjected, in Germany, the 
profits made by such partnerships to the same tax rate as profits made by partnerships 
established in Germany.168  
On the one hand, the line of reasoning based on the above two cases could be invoked by 
analogy. It is assumed that by denying the participation exemption the distributed income at 
the level of a parent company would be subject to the same tax rate as the dividends in a 
domestic situation.  
However, it is required to lay emphasis on the fact that exemption was not merely denied, but 
was substituted by the credit method. “Trading results” of the partnership were taxed in full in 
Germany, although Tax Office did offset the amount of tax paid on the amount in Belgium.169 
This gives reason to imply that had the resident state switched from the exemption method to 
the credit method in relation to the profit distribution, deductible for the tax purposes in the 
source state, such rules would have stood for better chances to be in compliance with the EU 
law. It is unlikely, however, that all Member states would agree to refrain from the exemption 
method in favor of the credit method in order to tackle double non-taxation in case of 
asymmetrical classification. 170  
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5.4.2 Case law on CFC rules 
Noteworthy, that the Court’s ruling in Columbus Container did not follow the way of 
reasoning in the AG’s opinion, which was held along the lines of a decision on the basis of 
CFC legislation.171 On the other hand, it could be assumed that “the deductibility of dividends 
or deductibility of payments that are classified inconsistently due to the application of 
different principles in the domestic tax legislation of Member States is merely a subset of the 
deviations that may have caused a company to be considered a low-tax company under the 
applicable CFC legislation of many Member States”.172  
If the Court would follow this line of reasoning, then it would be appropriate to compare a 
parent company owning a non-resident subsidiary, which treats the payments on hybrid 
instrument as interests, with a parent company owning non-resident subsidiary, which treats 
payment symmetrically. Thus, in the first case the participation exemption is denied, whereas 
in the second case the parent company enjoys the benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.  
The counter-argument that ”the disparity in the rates of corporation tax in effect within the 
Union constitutes an objective difference in situation justifying the differentiated treatment” 
was rejected173. 
It follows from the finding in Eurowings Luftverkehr174 and Barbier175, that low taxation 
applicable in a Member State cannot justify unfavourable tax treatment by another Member 
State and a Community national cannot be deprived of the right to rely on the provisions of 
the Treaty on the ground that he is profiting from tax advantages which are legally provided 
by the rules in force in a Member State other than his State of residence.176 To this end, one 
could expect that the deductibility of the payments at level of the paying company cannot 
constitute the relevant characteristic for making two situations incomparable. 
The paper now proceeds to consider the case law specifically on inbound dividends in terms 
of comparability of resident shareholders depending on the residence of their subsidiaries. 
 
5.4.3 Case law on inbound dividends 
In Lenz177 the Court found that Austrian shareholder who received revenue from capital from 
a company established in another Member state was in comparable situation with an Austrian 
shareholder who received dividends from Austrian companies. The comparability was 
established in the context of a tax rule designed to attenuate the effects of double taxation.178 
The common characteristic of two situations was the capability of being subject to double 
taxation. 
However, the situation of fully taxable entities might differ according to the place where they 
invested their capital. For instance, “the Member State in which the investments were made 	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already eliminated the risk of double taxation of company profits distributed in the form of 
dividends, by, for example, subjecting to corporation tax only such profits by the company 
concerned as were not distributed”.179 As a corollary, if the tax rules of a source state 
eliminate the risk of double taxation, the situations are not longer comparable with a view that 
the common characteristic disappears.180 
As such, one could raise doubts on comparability of nationally-sourced dividends and 
foreign-sourced dividends, which have been subject to deduction in a source member state, on 
the ground that by deducting the yield on hybrid financial instruments a source state actually 
has eliminated double taxation.181 However, given that a source state eliminates double 
taxation not for dividends, but for interests, the question remains unclear whether this shall be 
regarded as if “the common characteristic disappears”.  
5.4.4 Disparity  
The lack of comparability could be established on the ground of the Court’s decision in 
Schempp182. The dispute in that case was whether Mr. Shempp, a resident in Germany, could 
deduct the alimony payment made to his former spouse, who was a resident in Austria. 
German law, in case of alimony payment to non-residents, made the deduction conditional on 
the alimony being taxed in the Member State of the recipient, however alimony was not 
taxable in general in Austria.  With a view to the fact that unfavourable treatment was a 
consequence of a disparity in the tax law of the two Member States,183 the Court held that the 
refusal to allow Mr. Schempp to deduct the payments made to his wife in Austria did not 
constitute discrimination, which infringed Article 12 EC (now Article 18 of the TFEU).184  
This finding could have an impact on the comparability analysis. The national rule, which 
denies dividend exemption to a resident parent company in a cross border situation, could be 
immunized from the non-discriminatory provisions laid down in TFEU by linking it to the tax 
treatment of the correspondent payment in a source Member State. 
*      *      * 
It seems hard to safely conclude if the national rule based on the proposed amendment of the 
Article 4(1)(a) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive will pass the comparability test. It likely 
depends on the factor, which the Court would choose in order to form the backbone of the 
common characteristic for two situations. 
Consideration of the scholars’ debate in relation to the comparability of domestic anti-hybrid 
rules with the EU law has shown that the general conclusion is that the rule in question will 
result in less favourable treatment of the recipient of the payment if the payer is a non-
resident 185  and application of this rule likely violates the fundamental freedoms 186 . 
Particularly, it is feasible given the possibility of economic double taxation.    
5.5 Possible justification 
According to the settled case-law, a restriction of freedom of establishment is permissible 
only if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such 	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a case, that it should be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and 
not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.187 
5.5.1 Unacceptable justifications 
The idea behind the proposed amendment is not only to establish a level playing field, but 
also to reduce the loss of tax revenue. However, it is established case-law that the loss of tax 
revenue does not constitute an overriding reason in the public interest which may justify a 
measure which is in principle contrary to the fundamental freedom.188 
Similarly, counteracting harmful tax competition as an objective of the rules cannot be 
accepted in order to justify a restriction on freedom of establishment. It is may constitute a 
matter of a political nature and therefore has no effect on the rights and obligations of 
Member States under the Treaty.189 To that end, other justifications will be considered further. 	  
5.5.2 Prevention of tax avoidance 
The Court has consistently held that the prevention of tax avoidance may be relied upon to 
justify restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. 
However, a general presumption of tax avoidance or fraud is not sufficient to justify a fiscal 
measure, which compromises the objectives of the Treaty. 190 
In Cadbury Schweppes191 the ECJ stated that the fact that the taxpayer sought to profit from 
tax advantages in force in a Member State other than his own couldn’t in itself deprive the 
taxpayer of the right to rely on the provisions of the treaty.192 And as to the freedom of 
establishment, the fact that a company was established in a Member State for the purpose of 
benefiting from more favourable legislation does not in itself suffice to constitute abuse of 
that freedom.193 The Court clarified that in order for a restrictive measure to be justified on 
the ground of prevention of abusive practices, it must “specifically relate[s] to wholly 
artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the 
Member State concerned and “the specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent 
conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect 
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by 
activities carried out on national territory”.194 
Further clarification on the tax avoidance test could be based on the findings in Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation195 on thin capitalization legislation, which is 
deemed to be relevant with a view that a nature of hybrid finance includes debt. ECJ ruled out 
that that the legislation at issue was justified on the grounds based on the fight against abusive 
practices. However, in order for the legislation at issue to be proportionate 1) the taxpayers 
shall be allowed to produce evidence without undue administrative constraints as to the 	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commercial justification for the transaction in question196 and 2) where the transaction 
represents a purely artificial arrangement, reclassification of interests is limited to the 
proportion of the amount that exceeds arm’s length.197 
Follow this decision, it could be reasonably expected that once the company is able to provide 
evidence of the commercial reasons for the transactions and the terms of the involved hybrid 
financial instruments are at arm’s length, there will not be an abusive tax practice.198  
However, the general assumption that financing though hybrid financial instruments 
constitutes abuse of the fundamental freedom seems to be incorrect, unless this structure 
reflects genuine economic activity. This finds support in a recent case law of the Dutch 
Supreme Court concerning treatment of hybrid financial instruments for participation 
exemption purposes. The issue concerned a Dutch company, which refinanced its subsidiary 
in Australia by converting a loan to the subsidiary into redeemable preference shares (RPS) in 
the subsidiary. The issue in that case was whether the participation exemption should apply to 
income distributed on the RPS, taking into account the fact that RPS were tax deductible in 
Australia. One of the arguments put forward by the tax authorities was abuse of tax law. 
However, the Court made it clear that taxpayers were free to choose the form in which to 
finance their subsidiaries, taking into account the intent of the participation exemption.199 
To this end, once could expect that the rules, which do not target wholly artificial 
arrangements, but applied automatically, are not capable to justify the restriction of the 
freedom of establishment as it was in Lankhorst-Hohorst.200  
By contrast, in SGI201 the Court evolved its jurisprudence on abuse of law doctrine. The case 
was related to the transfer pricing rules, which resulted in economic double taxation. The 
Court’s decision demonstrates that in order for a Member State retain tax rules that constitute 
restriction on the freedom of establishment and treats cross-border situation less favourably 
compared to the domestic situation, the ones should not obligatory target wholly artificially 
arrangements. The justification for such rules could be based on the need to prevent tax 
avoidance “taken together with that of preserving the balanced allocation of the power to 
impose taxes between the Member States”.202 
Based on this, it should be further accessed, whether the balanced allocation of taxing rights 
could constitute part of the justification. 
5.5.3 Balanced allocation of taxing rights 
Accepted at first time in Marks&Spencer,203 however, in conjunction with prevention of 
double use of losses and the risk of tax avoidance, the balanced allocation between Member 
States of the power to tax became an independent justification in X Holding.204  With respect 
to this justification the Court stated that it may be accepted “in particular, where the system in 
question is designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of a Member State to 	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exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in its territory”205. However, 
unlikely that this justification is relevant for the linking rules, because the idea behind the 
latter is not to ensure the right to tax the activities carried out in the territory of the Member 
State.206 
5.5.4 Prevention of “double dip” 
The new proposal is aimed to clamp down on hybrid mismatch arrangements, which result in 
double non-taxation. Double non-taxation can be put on the same footing as the double use of 
losses because both are recognized forms of aggressive tax planning. 207 
The reason to prevent double use of losses has been accepted by the ECJ in order to justify the 
restrictive measure.208 However, this justification is always accompanied by another reason 
and based on ruling in Philips Electronics209, it could be concluded that the Court is reluctant 
to accept the objective to avoid double use of losses as an independent justification. 210 
In addition, the counterargument to the application of double non-taxation as a safe 
justification could be based on the statement in CIBA211, that Member States are not obliged 
to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of taxation of the other Member States 
in order, inter alia, to eliminate the double taxation arising from the exercise in parallel by 
those States of their fiscal sovereignty.212 Consequently, the Court concluded that the double 
taxation does not alone constitute a restriction prohibited by the Treaty.213 To this end, one 
could raise the question why should the Court protect Member States from double non-
taxation resulted from hybrid arrangements, but not protect taxpayers from Member States' 
double taxation of their profits? Arguably, neither is compatible with the Internal market.214 
On the other hand, as specified by Vanistendael “it is clear that to claim such a double 
deduction on the basis of the fundamental freedoms would be tantamount to the abuse of 
Community law. Such a double deduction would also violate the principle of neutrality 
characterizing the Single Market”.215 
5.5.5 Coherence of the tax system 
Cohesion is something of a mysterious concept that is invoked very often by Member States 
to defend their tax systems, but has only rarely been accepted by the Court.216 In respect of 
this justification AG Kokott observed that “[t]his rather diffuse concept … generally means 
no more than avoiding double taxation or ensuring that income is actually taxed, but only 
once (the principle of only-once taxation).”217 By the same token, one could notice that the 
aim of the proposed legislation change is to ensure the actual taxation of the payment made 	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under hybrid financial instrument, which is treated as tax deductible in a payer’s state.   
For the justification to be accepted by the Court it is required that there be a direct link “in the 
case of one and the same taxpayer, between the grant of a tax advantage and the offsetting of 
that advantage by a fiscal levy, both of which related to the same tax”.218  It could be argued 
that granting of dividend participation exemption refers to the pre-existing tax burden in a 
source Member State and if no pre-existing tax burden is present (advantage), denying of 
participation exemption can be seen as a way of off-setting of this advantage. To this end, 
cohesion is, at least, perceivable as a justification.219 
However, in Bosal220 the Court concluded that there was no direct link in the context of the 
same liability to tax because “parent companies and their subsidiaries are distinct legal 
persons, each being subject to a tax liability of its own”.221 On the other hand, based on the 
decisions dealing with dividend distributions, such as Commission v. Portugal 222  and 
Commission v. Germany223, it has been observed that the Court evolved its perception of the 
coherence concept and no longer seems require existence of a direct link in the case of one 
and the same taxpayer.224 
Before that AG Kokott also raised the question whether the criteria ‘one and the same 
taxpayer’ and ‘the same tax’ were binding and had to be both met, or whether they were only 
indicators – albeit strong ones – of the existence of a direct link between a tax advantage and 
disadvantage.225 In her reasoning in Manninen she deviated from the strictly legal point of 
view and interpreted the cohesion argument “from the point of view of the real effect of the 
tax rule in reducing double taxation even when the rule affects two different entities”226. One 
of the preconditions for this interpretation is that “the legal configuration of the system 
ensures that the advantage accrues to the one taxpayer only if the disadvantage to the other is 
real and in the same amount” (emphasis is added).227 
Even had the argumentation, supported denying of participation exemption, evolved based on 
that interpretation, it would have been hard to imagine existence of the numerical link 
between the amount paid at the level of the parent company and tax value of the 
correspondent yield on hybrid financial instrument deducted at the level of the subsidiary due 
to the different tax rates in Member States. 
Moreover, if the cohesion argumentation is based on the need to secure the principle of only-
once taxation, then in order to be relied on it, the country rules should also solve the problem 
of double-taxation in the event of “positive” classification conflict. However, it seems that the 
possibility of double-taxation is generally ignored.228  
*      *      * 
Based on the above consideration it is doubtful that the presented justification will be capable 	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to justify the linking rule on an independent basis if the rule would be found restrictive. 
However, in order to ensure compliance with principles of tax neutrality and equality one 
could expect that the Court will elaborate on justification as prevention of “double dip” 
structures in combination with fight of abusive practices. 
In the AG’s opinion in OyAA229, dealt with Finnish group taxation rules which precluded 
deduction of a transfer of profits made in favor of non-resident parent company, Kokott 
observed that actual taxation of income and prevention of tax avoidance could be achieved by 
a rule that makes the deductibility for tax purposes of an intra-group transfer conditional on 
proof that the income was in fact taxed in the hands of the recipient company.230 Interpreting 
the statement vice versa, i.e. making participation exemption for tax purposes conditional on 
proof that the income was in fact taxed at the hand of the distributing company, one could 
infer that the Court would find the linking rules justifiable. Another issue, however, is 
whether they would be found proportionate. 
 
5.6 Proportionality Test 
In order to fulfill the proportionality test the national rule should not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve its purpose and aim. At the present stage of research it is hard to 
conclude safety on fulfillment of the proportionality test since it depends on the actual 
wording of the rule. In general, the ECJ does not endorse an automatic prima facie rejection 
of the benefit of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, especially when the taxpayers are not 
entitled to provide evidence to the contrary.231 To this end, two essential elements can be 
highlighted for the rule to be proportional: 
- the rule shall provide for the possibility to the taxpayer to produce evidence on 
genuine economic context of the transaction and 
- the rule shall take into consideration the possible taxation of lower-tier subsidiaries in 
order to avoid economic double taxation in compliance with the purpose of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. But as the matter stands now, it is only foreseeable under the 
switch over to the credit method, that is, regrettably, not clarified by the proposed 
amendments.     
 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS 
The purpose of this thesis was to assess whether the proposed amendment of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, which contemplates to make participation exemption of the distributed 
profits conditional on the tax treatment of the correspondent payment in the source state, 
constitutes effective and comprehensive approach to tackle double non-taxation resulted from 
the “negative” classification conflict in relation to hybrid financial instruments.  
As the starting point for the study, it has been discussed that the different tax treatment of 
dividend and interest, regardless its antilogy to the principle of equal treatment and principle 
of neutrality, is an inevitable “bias” at the present stage of EU law. In addition, lack of 
common standards as to the method of classification of the payments made under hybrid 	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financial instruments exacerbates the issue of using these instruments in a tax planning tool 
kit. 
Further, the analysis of the OECD Model demonstrates that there is no obligation for the 
resident state to accept the classification of the source state, however the resident state is 
affected by the result of such classification made by the source state. Until recently, the main 
focus of double tax treaties has been on elimination of (juridical) double taxation. The 
existing OECD Model does not explicitly refer to the problem of double non-taxation caused 
by the qualification conflict and as a result, does not provide the clear guidance in that regard. 
The Commentaries, although, clarify specific articles of the OECD Model as being capable to 
counter negative consequences of mismatches. But in general, the tax treaty qualification 
serves a very limited purpose, however, this in no way means that further international 
common standards to the effective and coherent approach to the mismatches problems shall 
not be developed.   
Tax effect and handling of classification conflict under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 
the Interest and Royalty Directive are of greater interest. The main discussion among scholars 
is focused on the definition of the term “profit distribution”, or rather on its absence. The 
term, being one of the decisive factors, which assigns the benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive to the EU companies, is not defined by the Directive. In the absence of the 
autonomous definition it is preferable for the ECJ to identify certain criteria for the national 
authorities to apply in the consistent way.  
On the other hand, the Interest and Royalty Directive contains closed definition of interests 
and allows Member States to exclude certain types of hybrid debts from its scope, despite the 
fact that for domestic tax purposes the yield is still treated as interest. In such a way, the 
source state has the right to levy withholding tax. Following the amendment of the 
participation exemption provision in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, there is a risk of arising 
of juridical double taxation, unless the allocation of taxing rights under the double tax treaty 
solves the issue.  
It has been also revealed that neither of the considered Directives provides for reliable and 
exhaustive solution of the problem related to double taxation in case of “positive” 
classification conflict. This fact, in author’s opinion, undermines the Commission’s proposal 
to tackle double non-taxation to a great extent.  
The Commission’s proposal seems also to disregard the fact that the power to tax the profit 
distribution with reference to the tax treatment of the correspondent payment only in the first-
tier subsidiary could result in economic double taxation under certain circumstances. This 
result contradicts the objective of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive per se. 
In the light of the foregoing, it could be expected that a taxpayer involved in the cross-border 
transactions related to hybrid financing would find himself in a less favourable situation than 
a taxpayer acting within one Member State. However, it is hard to conclude whether the ECJ 
would hold that the two situations comparable with a view to the various factors involved in 
determination of the common characteristic.  
Important note is that tackling of classification mismatches does not fit in the concept of 
“abusive of law”. Mismatches arise in circumstances where there has been no attempt at tax 
manipulation and in this environment the suggestion that “every deduction must be matched 
by income somewhere is likely not only to catch avoidance but also sometimes the 
innocent”,232 i.e. catch not only artificial arrangements but those, which constitute bona fide 	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transactions. 
Other possible justifications were not found to be capable to immunize the denial of 
participation exemption rule on a stand-alone basis as well. On the other hand, it can be 
arguably assumed that the ECJ would develop a new combination of justifications in order to 
preclude double non-taxation as a hindrance, which violates the principles of tax neutrality 
and equality. But in the broader sense, amendment of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive alone 
contradicts with the principle of neutrality and the principle of fairness of tax system. Neutral 
tax system shall exclude double non-taxation but also double taxation. 233 
The author shares opinion that the proposal counters only the symptoms of unharmonized 
rules.234 The first public indications of suspicious attitude to the proposed amendment have 
already become evident.235  
In consideration of the foregoing, a more balanced approach through the use of commonly 
accepted definitions, such as debt and equity for tax purposes, and harmonization of diverse 
classifying methods are considered to be a more effective ways for achieving a level playing 
field. 
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233 M. Cotrut, L. Gerzova & O. Popa, ‘CFE Forum 2014: Policies for a Sustainable Tax Future’, European 
Taxation, Vol.54, No 6 (2014), Sec.2.2.1 
234 K. Dziurdź, ‘“Circularly Linked” Rules Countering Deduction and Non-Inclusion Schemes: Some Thoughts 
on a Tie-Breaker Test’, Bulletin for International. Taxation, Vol.67, No 6 (2013), p.310 citing M. Lang, 
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Annex B 
Figure 1  
 
 	  
CIT – Corporate Income Tax 
IRD – Interest and Royalties Directive 
WHT – Withholding Tax 
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Annex C 	  
Figure 1 	  
	  	  
CIT – Corporate Income Tax 
 
NB: the same tax rates are taken for simplicity in order to focus on the different tax effects 
between domestic and cross-border situation. The latter situation is also illustrated in terms of 
application of the current version of the PARENT-SUBSIDIARY DIRECTIVE and proposed 
amendment.    
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Figure 2 
 
 
CIT – Corporate Income Tax 
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